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Management Summary 
In 1995 the Cartel Act was passed by the regulators and with it the Competition 
Commission was set up. Since then the commission has investigated and enforced 
antitrust regulations for over 20 years. The commission is required by law to publish all 
of the decisions from the conducted investigations into economic misconduct. However, 
there does not exist an overview over the work done by them. Not even the commission 
itself has an overview of all their work. 
This thesis provides such an overview. It includes all the work done by the commission, 
but focuses mainly on the investigations into economic misconduct. It further analysis the 
impact different factors have on the outcome of the investigations. There are a multitude 
of factors which could potentially have an impact on it. There is the report route of the 
investigation, the type of misconduct, the year in which the decisions was issued and the 
economic sector the corporation operates in.  All of these are likely to have an impact in 
some way. 
To analyse the work done by the commission during this time all the publicly available 
annual reports and issued decisions were collected and put into a data set. To complete 
the data set outside information was added to all the information from the Competition 
Commission. This thesis presents and further analysis the collected data.  
Contrary to expectations the amount of issued decisions each year has not been rising. 
However, there has been both an upward trend in both the average time it takes the 
commission to complete an investigation and the amount of pages the published decision 
has. This could be explained by an increasing complexity. What has changed over the 
year is the type of the decision the investigation leads up to. In fact, it is the only factor 
which had a significant impact on the type of decision. For example, investigations after 
2011 were far more likely to end in an amicable settlement than at the beginning of the 
Competition Commission. The analysis further shows the type of economic misconduct 
does not have an impact on the outcome of the investigation. Corporations who made 
illegal agreements are nearly as likely to be forced to change their behaviour as 
corporations who abuse their dominance. The investigations for both are also nearly 
equally likely to be discontinued. The report route of the case also does not make a 
significant difference in the outcome of the investigations. The same is true for the 
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economic sector in which the corporation operates in. These results are quite surprising 
as the general expectation is that different types of misconduct should lead to different 
results. 
The next step in evaluating the work done by the Competition Commission would be to 
compare the findings of this thesis to similar studies of other antitrust agencies around the 
world. These comparisons would show if there are similarities or differences between the 
agencies, which could potentially offer new insights into antitrust regulations.   
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
On the 1st of February 1996 the revised Swiss Cartel Act came into law and with it the 
Competition Commission was set up. The Competition Commission replaced its 
predecessor the Cartel Commission with the new Cartel Act. The main purpose of the 
Cartel Act is to ensure fair competition and to stop harmful behaviour from market 
participants. Further the commission is in charge of monitoring companies with dominant 
market positions and looking for signs of anti-competitive conduct. They further have the 
ability to penalise unlawful economic behaviour. (Federal Act on Cartels and other 
Restraints of Competition (Cartel Act), 2014) 
This bachelor thesis provides a complete overview of all decisions the Competition 
Commission of Switzerland has issued between 1995 and 2015. So far, there does not 
exist an overview. Thus it is difficult to get an insight into the work of the Competition 
Commission. It is also difficult without an overview to see the amount of work they do 
each year. It is also not possible without an overview to see any changes from the 
Commissions work over the years. An overview could potentially show differences in the 
amount of work they do as well as changes in their decisions making. It is also important 
for the public to see the actual impact the Competition Commission has and to see if there 
are lasting effects of the Commissions decisions, or if the courts overturn all decisions on 
appeal. 
1.2 Scope 
In 1995 the Cartel Act was passed by the regulators and thus it is the obvious choice as 
the start year. This makes further sense as the start date of the analysis as it shows the 
amount of time it took from the government’s decision to pass the Cartel Act, to actually 
set up the commission and then for the commission to start its work, start investigating 
and eventually decide on its first case. For the end date the year 2015 was chosen as it is 
likely that not all cases that they started working on since then have already been 
completed. Even if they were completed, it is likely that there are still appeals hanging in 
the courts. Those cases therefore do not provide a full and true picture of the work done 
by the Competition Commission. 20 years is also a nice timeframe to see if things have 
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changed over the years. The thesis does not look at each individual appeal though it grants 
a short overview based on released information from the Competition Commission. 
1.3 Background 
1.3.1 Swiss Competition Commission 
The Swiss Competition Commission consists of twelve members, which have been 
elected by the Federal Council. A majority of these members are required by law to be 
“independent experts” meaning most of them are professors of economics or law at Swiss 
universities. The other members are representatives of business and consumer 
associations. This composition is meant to ensure the expertise and objectivity of the 
commission.  
The objective of the commission is to ensure fair competition across all different markets. 
Cases of harmful economic behaviour by undertakings are investigated by the 
commission. Upon finishing the investigation of a case the commission has the right to 
issue decision on the case. Decision issued by the commission can be appealed. Those 
appeals will then be handled by the Federal Administrative Court. If those decisions are 
further appealed the decisions then will be handled by the Federal Supreme Court. Apart 
from deciding on cases of harmful economic behaviour, the commission is also asked to 
provide expert opinions and recommendations to the Federal Council in questions of 
competition.  
The Cartel Act was passed in 1995 and came into law the following year 1996 
(Commission, n.d.). However, the first real investigation of the Competition Commission 
started on the 24th of September in the same year. It would take another 223 days until 
the commission issued their first decision on the 5th of May 19971. Further the 
Commission has only published annual reports from 1997 onwards. Despite that, this 
thesis takes a look at the committee from 1995, when the Cartel Act was passed, all the 
way up to 2015. 
The decision of the last investigation falling into the time frame was issued on the 14th of 
December 2015. The investigation was opened on 26th of November 2012 and was 
looking into an illegal agreement about market split-up between distributors of pianos 
                                                 
1 Telecom PTT/Blue Window, 24.09.1996-05.05.1997, LPW 1997-2, p. 161-175 
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and grand pianos. The Competition Commission eventually came to an amicable 
settlement with the involved corporations.2  
1.3.2 Literature Review 
There have been a few studies done which look at antitrust enforcement around the world. 
One of those was done by Martin Carree, Andrea Maria Günster and Maarten Pieter 
Schinkel which was titled “European Antitrust Policy 1957-2004: An Analysis of 
Commission Decisions” and was published in 2010. The study focused on all cases 
investigated by the European Commission between 1957 and 2004. It found that there is 
a correlation between country of origin and decision type, between OECD sector and 
decision type & report route and decision type (Carree, Günster & Schinkel, 2010).  Other 
examples of European antitrust studies are Schinkel (2007) and Veljanovski (2007).  
Other studies before then mostly focused on mergers in Europe. Apart from studies about 
the European Union as a whole, there are also studies about the competition policies in 
individual European countries. Further, there have been a number of studies focusing on 
the antitrust enforcement in the United States. Examples of these are the studies from 
Posner (1970 and 2001), Gallo et al. (1985, 1986, 1994 and 2000), Corwin (1992), Lin et 
al. (2000), Baker (2003) and Ghosal and Stennek (2007). However, there is no study 
looking at the Swiss antitrust enforcement. 
The theoretical background for this thesis is based on the work of two different authors. 
First off, there is “Competition Policy: Theory and Practice” (2004) by Massimo Motta, 
which mainly focuses on European competition law. There is also Nicholas Gr. Mankiw’s 
book “Essentials of economics” (2014), which explains the theory behind competition 
and focuses mainly on the US market.  
  
                                                 
2 Flügel und Klaviere, 26.11.2012-14.12.2015, LPW 2016-3, p. 652-722 
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1.4 Antitrust Regulation 
1.4.1 Cartel Act of 1995 
The purpose of the Cartel Act of 1995 is to stop the formation of cartels and ensure cartels 
cannot have harmful effects on the economy. Further it is supposed to promote 
competition in the market (Cartel Act, 2014, Chapter 1 Art. 1). The law applies to all 
public- and private undertakings, whose practices have an effect on Swiss markets, no 
matter their country of origin (Cartel Act, 2014, Chapter 1 Art. 2). However, other 
statutory provisions from the government restricting competition in certain markets have 
precedence over the Cartel Act. There are three different definitions of unlawful economic 
behaviour prohibited by the Cartel Act. First verbal and nonverbal agreements between 
two or more parties with the purpose of restraining the competition are prohibited. 
Secondly a merger, or any deal, seeing one undertaking take control over one another, 
can be prohibited by the competition commission, if the deal could result in a too 
dominant undertaking. Lastly, dominant undertakings are not allowed to abuse their 
strong market position to create an unfair market for consumers and competitors (Cartel 
Act, 2014, Chapter 1 Art. 3). 
There are several types of unlawful restraints of competition. Any agreement restricting 
competition in a goods or services market, which cannot be justified because of economic 
efficiency, is not allowed. Agreements from competitors to fix prices directly or indirectly 
are unlawful. Further agreements limiting the amount of goods that can be bought, as well 
as agreements to split up markets based on locations, are illegal (Cartel Act, 2014, Chapter 
2 Art. 5). These regulations reflect the six economic rationales. These six economic 
rationales are defined as horizontal violations, abuse of dominance, licensing, vertical 
restraints, joint ventures and mergers by the paper “European Commission decisions on 
competition: economic perspectives on landmark antitrust and merger cases” (Carree, 
Günster & Schinkel, 2010). The Cartel Act is supposed to stop these from happening and 
enable the commission to investigate possible violations and punish infringements. 
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1.4.2 Evolution of the Cartel Act 
Since the Cartel Act came into law there were several revisions of it. Since 1995 there 
have been nine revisions, with each changing little details, but the overall objectives 
staying the same since the regulations first came into law. Those revisions are meant to 
ensure that the Cartel Act continues to have the desired effect the government hopes for. 
The last one, which came into law in 2014, introduced a section into the Cartel Act, which 
regulates the data exchange with foreign competition authorities. (Cartel Act, 2014) 
1.5 Publication of Decisions 
The Competition Commission is required by law to inform the public about their doings. 
They are further required to report their work yearly to the Federal Council (Cartel Act, 
2014, Art. 49 para. 1). They are also allowed to publish the decisions of investigations, 
but they are not allowed to publish certain business secrets of the investigated 
undertakings (Cartel Act, 2014, Art. 48 para. 1). 
In practice this means the commission is publishing their annual reports online and in 
addition publish a report of what they have done quarterly. However, they only started 
doing this in 1997, meaning there is no public information available of any work done by 
the Competition Commission before then. Most of the reports of investigations are 
published in German, yet there are some cases where the reports are in French or Italian. 
Further they have used different structures to report their investigations over the years 
and sometimes even in the same year. For example, they have not always published the 
procedural costs or the exact sanction numbers. The following analysis is only based on 
publicly available information.  
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2. Analysis of the Competition Commission’s Decisions 
To analyse the work done by the commission during this time all the publicly available 
annual reports (Competition Commission Annual Reports, n.d.) and issued decisions 
(Competition Commission LPW, n.d.) were collected and put into a data set. This data 
set was then analysed. 
2.1 Other work done by the Swiss Competition Commission from 1995 – 2015 
2.1.1 Expert Reports, Recommendations and Opinions 
The Competition Commission has a number of duties besides their main task of 
investigating economic behaviour. One of those duties is to make recommendations to 
the authorities in order to help with the advancement and protection of fair economic 
competition. The commission is also in charge of providing expert opinions on economic 
regulation currently considered by the government. For this purpose they are required to 
write expert reports. The commission is further in charge of responsibilities such as 
performing follow-up checks, accompanying conversion and determining dispositions. 
Expert reports, recommendations and opinions etc. Total 
Accompanying Conversion 11 
Expert reports (Art. 15 Cartel Act) 23 
Recommendations (Art. 45 Cartel Act) 24 
Expert opinions (Art. 47 Cartel Act, 5 para. 4 PMA or 11a TCA) 44 
Follow-up checks 56 
Determining dispositions 4 
Notices (Art. 6 Cartel Act) 12 
Opinions (Art. 46 para. 1 Cartel Act)  1944 
Table 1 - Expert reports, recommendations and opinions etc. 1995 – 2015 
During the 20 years of their existence the commission was asked to provide their opinions 
a total number of 1944 times, around 97 times a year. This most likely means that the 
Competition Commissions opinion is highly valued and that the commission is seen as 
very competent. They also conducted on average 2.8 follow up checks each year. 
Interestingly 25 of the follow-up checks were conducted between 1997 and 1999, while 
they were none at all in 2015. In fact there was only one time since 2011 when they 
conducted more than one check.  
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2.1.2 IMA 
There is a second set of regulations apart from the Cartel Act, which the Competition 
Commission is in charge of enforcing, namely the Internal Market Act. The Internal 
Market Act is supposed to ensure free and equal market access for employment to people 
living in Switzerland. (Bundesgesetz über den Binnenmarkt Binnenmarktgesetz, 2007, 
Chapter 1, Art. 1) The commission is also asked to give out recommendations and to 
conduct investigations as well as writing expert and explanatory reports for its set of 
regulations. 
IMA Total 
Recommendations / Investigations (Art. 8 IMA) 23 
Expert reports (Art. 10 I IMA)  13 
Explanatory reports (Secretariat) 310 
Appeals (Art. 9 para. 2bi s IMA) 24 
Table 2 - IMA 1995 – 2015 
Based on the numbers above, the committee wrote a total number of 310 explanatory 
reports. This leads to the conclusion that there was a lot of uncertainty and a lack of 
understanding of the regulations over the years. 
2.1.3 Other Activity 
Under “other activities” the commission lists all work done, which is not part of their 
main duties. This includes tasks such as monitoring certain markets, answering various 
different enquires and providing advice for other government agencies as well as public 
and private undertakings. 
Other Activities Total 
Notifications under Art. 49a para. 3 let. a Cartel Act 204 
Advice 401 
Market monitoring 832 
Freedom of information applications 36 
Reports of failure to pass on foreign exchange benefits 485 
Other enquiries 5167 
Table 3 - Other Activities 1995 - 2015 
To note is that all of the 485 failures to pass on foreign exchange benefits were reported 
between 2011 and 2013. 
Simon Kohler 
 
24/05/2017 Swiss Antitrust Enforcement between 1995 and 2015 13 
2.1.4 Mergers 
The commission has the duty to investigate mergers. The reason is to see if the merger of 
the two or more existing undertaking would result in a new undertaking, which would 
have an overly dominant market position. In this case the commission has the power to 
disallow the merger. While some antitrust enforcement agencies in other countries 
combine mergers with the other types of economic misconduct in their investigations, in 
Switzerland the Competition Commission has decided to investigate and report them on 
their own. Companies, which are planning a merger with another company, are required 
by law to inform the commission about said merger if they fulfil one of two criteria. First 
if the involved parties combined have a revenue of upwards of 2 billion Swiss francs or 
revenues over 500 million on Swiss markets. Secondly, if two or more of the involved 
undertakings have a turnover of at least 100 million Swiss Franc on Swiss markets. There 
are further special criteria for some types of corporations such as banks or insurance 
companies. (Cartel Act, 2014, Art. 9) 
Mergers Total 
Notifications 613 
No objection after preliminary examination 515 
Investigations 46 
Decisions of the Competition Commission 41 
… After preliminary examination 43 
… After investigation 13 
Sanctions 13 
Early implementation 8 
Table 4 – Mergers 1995 - 2015 
During the existence of the commission it has received a total number of 613 notifications. 
However, in 84% of those cases the commission had no objections after a preliminary 
investigation. The amount of notifications the commission receives each year has been 
relatively stable with no recognisable trend. The least amount of notifications the 
commission received was 21 in 2004 and there was only one year where they received 
more than 45 notifications.  
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2.1.5 Preliminary Investigations 
The commission also conducts preliminary investigations to figure out if full scale 
investigations are necessary. Preliminary investigations are opened if the Competition 
Commission has reason to believe there is illegal behaviour from one or more undertaking 
in the market. They can also be opened if the commission either receives a lead from an 
insider or a complaint from an undertaking about the behaviour of its supplier or 
competitors. 
Preliminary Investigations Total 
Concluded  390 
… Investigations opened 68 
… Modification of conduct 90 
… No consequences  137 
Table 5 - Preliminary Investigations 1995 - 2015 
Over the years the Competition Commission conducted a total number of 390 preliminary 
investigations. However, in only 68 cases did the commission open a full investigations 
based on their preliminary results. In a further 90 cases the involved parties were forced 
to change their economic conduct. These numbers mean that in only 17.5% of the 
investigations the commission found it necessary to open an investigation. This shows 
the commission prefers if the investigated parties agree to modify their behaviour so no 
full investigations are necessary. Further they believe more often than not no full 
investigations by them are required. If we look at how those numbers developed over the 
years one can see that there is a downward trend in the amount of preliminary 
investigations opened each year. The data shows that at the very beginning of the 
commissions the most preliminary investigations were opened with 44, which justifies 
the need for passing of the Cartel Act in 1995. 
Having given an overview of the commissions other work from 1995 to 2015 the thesis 
will now focus on the main duty of the commission. Their main duty is to conduct 
investigations into harmful economic behaviour. In the following sections the paper will 
analyse the investigations and decisions regarding the economic conduct of companies in 
Swiss markets.  
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2.2  Total Number of Investigations 
Investigations Total 
Final decisions 120 
… Change of behaviour 33 
… Amicable settlements 32 
… Discontinued 39 
… Sanctions under art. 49a para. 1 Cartel Act 4 
… Other 12 
Procedural decision 32 
Precautionary measures 24 
Sanctions under art. 50 Cartel Act 6 
Table 6 - Total Investigations 1995 - 2015 
Since its inception in 1995 up until the end of 2015, the Competition Commission has 
issued a ruling in 120 cases. In 32 of these cases the commission and the other parties 
involved came to an amicable settlement on how to move forward. In 36 of the 120 
investigations ended up with the examined company having to change their behaviour, 
while 39 of the investigations ended up discontinued. Under “Other” are all decisions 
from investigations which are not into economic misconduct. For example, this can be an 
investigations into a request to access records or an investigation into the request to stop 
another investigation. At the end of 2015, there were still another 22 ongoing cases. The 
first official ruling was issued on the 5th of May 1997, which is a little over five months 
after they started their first full investigation. Unsurprisingly the first decision happened 
to be for the first opened investigation.3  
From 1995 to 2015 the commission has issued an average of six decision per year. They 
further worked on 21 investigation each year and launched just over six new 
investigations each year. This shows that the commission coped very well with their work 
load as they were able to finish as many cases as they were opening during a normal year. 
Although this also means that they are not able to reduce their amount of open 
investigations (on average 21 each year), because as soon as they are able to issue a 
decision for an investigations they usually open a new one. 
                                                 
3 Telecom PTT/Blue Window, 24.09.1996-05.05.1997, LPW 1997-2, p. 161-175 
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Figure 1 - Investigations 1997 - 2015 
Looking at the year to year numbers, the number of investigations conducted during the 
year is on a steady increase. There is no distinguishable trend in the amount of 
investigations opened each year. Further the amount of issued decisions grew until 2001, 
but then went back to 1997 levels. Since 2001 the numbers of the final decisions have 
been relatively stable. There is no one obvious single factor leading to the increase until 
2001 and then to the drop of the number of issued decision each year. After 2001 the 
amount of final decision remained relatively stable though there was a single year spike 
in the amount of completed investigations in 2004.  
On average an investigation took 879 days from the official opening until completion of 
said investigation. The shortest investigation taking only 96 days to complete. It was an 
investigation into the necessity of pre-emptive measures regarding sports in pay-tv4. On 
the other hand the investigation into the termination of cell phone contracts of the three 
big providers Swisscom AG, Sunrise Communications AG and Orange Communications 
took just over nine years to complete (3345 days). The investigation was officially opened 
                                                 
4 Sport im Pay-TV – Vorsorgliche Massnahmen, 03.04.2013-08. 07.2013, LPC 2014-2, p. 387-391 
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on the 15th of October in 2002 and was finished on the 12th of December 2011. This was 
the longest investigation by far5. The second longest one took 478 days less6.  
The following graph shows the average amount of time it took to complete an 
investigation. The investigations count to the year in which the Competition Commission 
issued the rulings. This means that in some years there is not a large amount of completed 
investigations meaning outliers have a larger effect. 
Looking at how the average completion time develops over time one can see a clear trend 
emerging. The first five years (1997 – 2002) happen to be the five years where on average 
it took the least amount of time to complete an investigation. Further after the first two 
years an upwards trend started until the end of 2006, when the number of days seemed to 
drop again.  
  
                                                 
5 Terminierung Mobilfunk, 15.10.2002-  12.12.2011, LPC 2011-4, p. 522-529 
6 Submission Betonsanierung am Hauptgebäude der Schweizerischen Landesbibliothek, 13.01.2000 - 
19.11.07, LPC 2009-4, p. 339-349 
Figure 2 - Average Amount of Days / Average amount of Pages 
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The period from 2005 to 2009 included five of the six years where it took over a 1000 
days on average to complete an investigation. The rise in the time it took to complete an 
investigation could be explained by a rise in complexity over the years. However, there 
is no known single factor that lead to a drop after 2007. 
Interestingly there is no correlation between the amount of days it takes to finish an 
investigation and the amount of pages the publication of the decision has. In fact 2006 
was the year that it took on average the longest to complete an investigation, but in the 
same year the issued decisions had nearly the fewest amount of pages. Further the 
decision of the investigation which took the longest to complete only consisted of seven 
pages, meaning less than one per year that the investigation was conducted7. There is a 
clear and stable upwards trend in the amount of pages per investigation.  
                                                 
7 Terminierung Mobilfunk, 15.10.2002-  12.12.2011, LPC 2011-4, p.522 
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2.3 Types of Decisions 
There are four distinct types of decisions the Competition Commission makes use of. 
Firstly, the Competition Commission can decide that the investigated companies have to 
change their behaviour so they no longer violate economic regulations. Secondly, the 
commission can accept an amicable settlement they worked out with the investigated 
undertakings. Third, if during the investigation it turns out that there is no actual violation 
they can decide to discontinue their investigation. Lastly, they can sanction companies, 
who have violated the regulations by their behaviour in the past, but do not have to change 
their behaviour right now. Further the commission can for any of the types decide who 
has to pay the procedural costs and they can issue fines to companies for their involvement 
in the economic misconduct.  
Figure 3 - Competition Commission Decisions 
The hypothesis of independence of the year in which the decisions was issued and the 
type of the decision can be tested by the chi-squared test. The significance level to reject 
the hypothesis of independence is one percent. The result of the test is 0.0013, which 
means that there is a dependence between the year and the type of the decision. In fact, it 
is a very low test result, which indicates a big differences in the types of decisions each 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Competition Commission Decisions
Forced to change behaviour Amicable settlements Discontinued Sanctions
Simon Kohler 
 
24/05/2017 Swiss Antitrust Enforcement between 1995 and 2015 20 
year. This points to a strong correlation between the year of the decision and the type of 
the decision. 
Looking closer at the data one can see that there recently has been an upwards trend in 
amicable settlements compared to the other types of decision. Especially after 2011 there 
has been a rise in amicable settlements between the Competition Commission and the 
investigated corporations. While over the whole timeframe nearly one out of three 
investigations ends in an amicable settlement, since 2011 48% of the cases ended up in 
settlements.  
Until the end of 2004 48% of all investigations were stopped by the Competition 
Commission. The large amount of discontinued investigations at the beginning of the 
commission is obviously a bad sign and makes people question the necessity and 
efficiency of the commission. However, the amount of discontinued cases has been 
slowly going down over the years. In fact in all of 2012, 2013 and 2015 there were no 
investigations discontinued. This proves that the commission has become more efficient 
and knowledgeable about what to investigate. Over the whole 20 years 36% of the 
investigations ended up with the commission closing the investigation, because the found 
no unlawful economic behaviour by the investigated corporations.  
The first investigation that ended with a sanction for a corporations past behaviour was 
completed in 2008. The amount of decision that end up with the commission forcing the 
undertakings to change their behaviour have been on a slight downward trend over the 
whole timeframe.  
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2.4  Report Route of Cases 
The Competition Commission has three different ways they can be informed about new 
cases. First, the commission can open investigations themselves if they have reason to 
believe that there is ongoing illegal economic behaviour. Secondly, corporations have the 
possibility to report themselves to the Competition Commission if they are unsure about 
the legality of their behaviour or if they have realised their past behaviour violates laws. 
Further competitors, customers and distributors of companies, who conduct themselves 
unlawfully, can notify the commission if they have either reason to suspect or proof of 
illegal economic behaviour. 
 Figure 4 - Report Route versus Decision Type 
To see if each of the report routes have the same amount of chance to result in any decision 
type we can conduct a chi-squared test. If there is more than a one percent significance 
then the hypothesis of an even distribution has to be rejected. For the relation the between 
report route versus decision type the test results in a significance of 0.017. Thus the report 
does not correlate with the decision type. However the self-reported case do seem to get 
different results compared to the other two report routes. 
30% of all investigations started by Competition Commission themselves end in the 
commission forcing to change the behaviour of the investigated corporations. The exact 
same amount of the cases end in amicable settlement and another 37% of all 
investigations end up discontinued.  
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Investigations opened by the commission after they were notified have a slightly larger 
percentage in discontinued cases with 41.18%. 32.35% of investigations opened after 
outside notification end with the examined companies having to change their behaviour 
and another 23.53% end up with an amicable settlement. The percentages for 
investigations started by the commission and the percentages for the investigations 
opened after outside notification are quite similar. This proves that the commission judges 
each case the same way no matter how the investigation started.  
This is different for cases where the companies reported themselves. Corporations, which 
have reported themselves to the Competition Commission, tend to seek an amicable 
settlement with the commission. The commission might also be more likely to accept a 
settlement when companies admit their own mistakes. It is thus no surprise that out of the 
nine cases where this happened only two did not end up in settlements. Out of these two 
cases, the commission forced one company to change their behaviour, while the in the 
other case the corporation ended up with a sanction for their past behaviour. 
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2.5 Decisions by Type of Misconduct 
The Competition Commission deals with a multitude of economic behaviours, which 
violate regulations. There are four, which occur the most often. First, there are horizontal 
violation. These consists mainly of competitors agreeing on prices, market split-ups, bids 
for contracts or hindering the entry of new competition. Secondly, there are corporation 
abusing their dominant market position to either prevent any competition or short-change 
those dependent on them. Further there are also illegal vertical restraints, which are 
mostly illegal agreements between corporations and their distributors about prices, 
market split-ups or about the hindrance of new entry of competition. Lastly there are 
mergers, which can be prohibited by the commission, if they are found to be harmful for 
the economy. However, the commission deals with mergers separately and uses 
investigations only for the three before mentioned economic behaviours.  
To test the statistical significance of the distribution of the decisions for each type of 
violation it is important to take a look at the chi-squared test. The results of the test show 
there is no significant difference between the expected and the actual results. In fact the 
results show a very high value of 0.7328 for the distribution. This high of a value proves 
the type of misconduct has no impact on the eventual decision by the commission.  
Figure 5 - Economic Conduct versus Decision Type 
12
14
6
17
10
4
14
17
5
1
2
1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Horizontal Abuse of Dominance  Vertical Restraints
Economic Conduct versus Decision Type
Forced to change of behaviour Amicable settlements Discontinued Sanctions
Simon Kohler 
 
24/05/2017 Swiss Antitrust Enforcement between 1995 and 2015 24 
The most common violation of economic regulation that the Competition Commission 
investigates are horizontal misconducts. However, there were nearly as many abuses of 
dominance, while there were a lot fewer illegal vertical restraints. The decisions for cases 
looking into horizontal economic violations are very equally distributed. 27.27% of the 
investigations end in the commission forcing the corporations to change their behaviour, 
38.64% end in settlements and 31.82% end up discontinued. The decisions for abuse of 
dominance are not as evenly distributed. The big difference being the amount of 
examinations ending with an amicable settlement. Only 23.26% of them end in 
settlements, while 32.56% end in change of behaviour and 39.53% were discontinued. 
The investigation into vertical restraint violations are also very evenly distributed. Further 
there was also at least one case for each of the different violations where the decisions 
ended up as a sanction.  
In general the decisions are pretty evenly spread for all three main types of economic 
misconduct, showing that there is no possibility to foresee the outcome of the 
investigation based on the type of misconduct. This is in stark contrast to findings from 
the European antitrust commission in the paper “European Antitrust Policy 1957-2004: 
An Analysis of Commission Decisions”, where abuse of dominance and horizontal 
violations usually ended with an infringement verdict. Further they found out that the 
decisions were heavily impacted by the type of economic misconduct (Carree, Günster, 
Schinkel, 2010). 
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2.6 Conduct by Economic Sectors 
It is important to know if the economic sector that the company operates in has any 
connection to the decision by the Competition Commission. The following graphs shows 
the decisions of the investigations in each economic sector. Manufacturing combines all 
decisions of the categories “Food & Drinks”, “Chemicals”, “Plastics, Rubber & Glass” 
and “Metal Products & Engineering”.  
Figure 6 - Economic Sectors versus Decision Type 
The results of the chi-squared mean the hypothesis of independence between economic 
sectors and the issued type of decision has to be accepted as the result is 0.016 (rejected 
at a one per cent significance level). This means there is no significant correlation between 
the economic sector of the company investigated and the type of the eventual issued 
decision. Given the small sample size for some economic sectors, one might interpret the 
results cautiously. 
However, based on data available there are certain economic sectors were clear trends 
can be seen in the decision making by the Competition Commission. For example in less 
than 15% of the investigations into companies, involved in manufacturing, were the 
examined companies not found guilty and the investigation discontinued. This is a lot 
lower than the overall percentage of 36.11%. Further it is very noticeable that there is an 
abnormal amount of amicable settlements decisions in the “Metal Products & 
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Engineering” sectors. 62.5% of the cases ended in a settlement for companies in this 
sector and the sector contributed nearly one third of all decisions ending in settlements. 
Further, there is a larger than normal amount of discontinued cases in the “Electricity & 
Gas”, “Communication” and the “Public Service” sectors. In those sectors the statistics 
show the commission was more likely to discontinue the case than to come to any other 
conclusion to the investigation. In 55.56% of all examinations in the “Construction” 
sector the investigated corporations were forced to change their behaviour. This is a 
significantly higher than the average percentage. Decisions in both the “Trade & Hotel” 
as well as the “Banking and Insurance” sectors are evenly distributed. There is no 
significant trend in the decisions for either of the sectors visible.  There have not been a 
lot of investigations into the “Food & Drinks” manufacturing, the “Plastics, Rubber & 
Glass” manufacturing and the “Transport” sectors. Thus it is not possible to make any 
conclusions about the distribution of the different types of decisions issued by the 
commission for these sectors.   
  
Simon Kohler 
 
24/05/2017 Swiss Antitrust Enforcement between 1995 and 2015 27 
2.7 Enforcement of the Competition Rules 
It is not enough for a commission to hand out punishments on undertakings, if those 
decision then end up being overturned by the appeal courts. In Switzerland the Federal 
Administrative Court handles all appeals of commission’s decisions. If those court 
decision are further appealed the case goes to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. The 
Federal Supreme Court then gets to have the final decision. A high number of overturned 
Competition Commission decisions would mean that either the commission is unqualified 
to investigate or that the Cartel act is quite ambiguous and can be interpreted in different 
ways. Either way it would show that there would be changes in Switzerland’s antitrust 
enforcement necessary. The Competition Commission has only published the full data of 
the appeal proceedings in their annual reports since 2009, though they published some 
data in both 2007 and 2008. 
Appeal proceedings Total 
Judgments of the Federal Administrative Court 33 
… Success for the competition authority 26 
… Partial success 3 
Judgments of the Federal Supreme Court 5 
… Success for the competition authority 4 
… Partial success 0 
Table 7 - Appeal proceedings 2007 – 2015 
The statistics of the appeal proceedings give information on how many of their decision 
get overturned by the federal judges on appeal. Only five decision have been completely 
overturned by the judges. Another seven were partial successes for the commission, while 
the rest were complete victories for them. The data also shows that one fifth of all decision 
of the Federal Administrative Court will usually be further appealed. The commission has 
a complete success rate of 78.8% in front of Federal Administrative Court judges and a 
complete success rate of 80% in front of federal Supreme Court judges. Both of those are 
rates are satisfactory. The commission thus has been mostly successful in courts. This 
proves they had a lasting effect on the economy and that cartel the act is very successful 
at doing what it is supposed to do. 
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Apart from looking at the number of appeals, there is a second method of judging the 
success of the Competition Commissions antitrust enforcement. Namely to look at the 
amount of repeated investigations into the same behaviour and the expansion or revisit of 
past investigations. The more often the commission has to fully repeat or add to former 
investigation the less time and cost effective they are.  
For the Swiss commission there has been one case in particular in which they had trouble 
of enforcing their ruling. The case involves the Swatch Groups announcement to stop 
delivering clock components to other companies8. Swatch first announced their decision 
to no longer supply the components to companies other than their subsidiaries on the 
18.12.2009. In the spring of 2010 the Swatch Group first contacted the Competition 
Commission to inform them of their course of action. From very early on the Swatch 
Group has been cooperative and looking for an amicable settlement. Despite that it took 
until the 6th of June 2011 to finally agree on a settlement. This settlement was supposed 
to be valid until the end of 2012, yet there was an extension to it announced on the 
07.05.20129. On the 9th of September 2013 the Competition Commission and the Swatch 
Group agreed on another amicable settlement10. This settlement obligating Swatch to 
continue delivering a defined amount of watch components to their competition until the 
end of 2019. This is just happens to be one of a few instances where the commission had 
multiple investigations and decision for one violation of the regulations. Investigations 
like the one above display the difficulty that the commission faces and the trouble they 
sometimes have to enforce their decisions.   
                                                 
8 Swatch Group Lieferstopp, 06.06.2011 - 06.06.2011, LPC 2011-3, p.400-409 
9 Swatch Lieferstopp – Verlängerung der Vorsorglichen Massnahmen vom  6. Juni 2011, 06. Jun 11 - 06. 
Jun 11, LPC 2012-2, p. 2 60-264 
10 Swatch Group Lieferstopp, 06.06.2011-21.10.2013, LPC 2014-1, p.215-287 
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3. Conclusion 
Since the Cartel Act was passed in 1995, the Competition Commission has done a 
multitude of tasks. However, the first investigation was only started in the back end of 
1996 and the first one was actually finished in 1997. In general before 1997 there was not 
a lot of work done by the commission as it was more about setting up a structure to carry 
out investigation in the future. Despite that, the data from the competition commission 
shows no significant improvement in the way the commission conducts their 
investigations over the years. One would expect the commission to get more efficient 
over time and to be able to handle a bigger workload. Nonetheless there is no noteworthy 
rise in the amount of investigations finished each year, although there has been a rise in 
the amount of days needed to finish an investigation as well as an increasing amount of 
pages of the published decisions. This could be a sign of an increasing complexity in the 
investigations. Although the decisions of investigations, which took the most amount of 
time, do not necessarily contain the most amount of pages. 
What has been changing over the years, are the decisions that the investigations lead up 
to. The commission has worked out and agreed to more amicable settlements in recent 
years. In fact there are more amicable decisions than one would expect to find. This shows 
that the commission is very willing to work with the rule breakers. This can be seen as a 
positive thing as it shows the companies readiness to admit their mistakes and work with 
the Competition Commission. However, it could also be seen as a negative thing as it 
shows the lack of willingness to hand out fair punishment to the corporation under 
investigation.  
The commission has been mostly successful in not letting the report route significantly 
impact the outcome of cases. Only in investigations where the companies reported 
themselves are the examined organisations far more likely to come to an amicable 
settlement. As expected the most common report route for the commission was to be 
notified by an outside organisation or person. No impact on the decisions either has the 
type of misconduct. The type of outcomes are evenly spread for all of the main types of 
misconduct that the commission investigates.  
The economic sector, in which the investigated corporation operates in, has no significant 
impact on the type of decisions either. While investigations in certain sectors tend to have 
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different type of decisions compared to the overall trend in decisions, those differences 
are too small to be classified as significant by the chi-squared test.  
Analysing the annual reports of the commission additionally shows that the commission 
actually does a lot of work outside of investigating unlawful economic behaviour.  One 
of those tasks is the examination of potential mergers. Those examinations mostly end 
with the commission accepting the mergers, often without more than a preliminary 
investigation. Even if there is an investigation necessary the commission accepts the 
merger more often than not. The commission also conducts preliminary investigations to 
find out if there is reason to suspect that there is an actual violation. The commission has 
done a poor job in selecting these preliminary investigations as only 17.5% of these 
actually led to a full scale investigation. Apart from enforcing the Cartel Act the 
commission is also supposed to enforce the Internal Market Act. They are asked to write 
expert and explanatory reports. The usefulness of most of these other tasks, done by the 
commission, is impossible to quantify. There is also no way of judging the quality of the 
work without an expert looking at each and every one of these reports. 
To conclude, the Competition Commission has done a lot of important work over the 20 
year timespan. They have given a lot of advice and written quite a few expert reports to 
help regulators. Additionally the commission has been quite successful in the conduction 
of investigations into unlawful economic behaviour. The results of those investigation 
have mostly not been overruled after appeals in front of the courts and there have also not 
been many repeat offenders. All of this points to a successful first twenty years of 
existence for the Cartel Act and the commission with it. However it is not possible to 
fairly judge the amount and the quality of work that the Competition Commission has 
done with just the publicly available information. The amount of public information is 
not sufficient for this, as there is a lack of facts and figures for each of the published 
investigations. The commission should thus consider to publish the amount of 
commission employees involved, the numbers of work hours, as well as the internal costs, 
for each investigation. They should further standardise the way they report their decisions. 
Only by making changes would it be possible to fairly judge their work.   
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B)  Data Set based on Competition Commissions Annual Reports 
Investigations 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Conducted during the year   12 14 23 28 22 23 23 24 15 18 18 20 20 20 21 22 24 21 30 398 
… Carried forward from previous 
year 
  4 7 12 16 18 9 19 21 12 14 15 13 16 14 16 15 17 19 15 272 
… Investigations opened   8 7 11 12 4 14 4 3 3 4 3 7 4 6 5 7 7 2 6 117 
… New investigations from divided 
investigations 
  0                   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 
Final decisions   5 3 8 11 13 4 5 10 4 4 7 4 6 5 6 5 7 6 7 120 
… Change of behaviour         0 3 1 2 1 1 2 3   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 
… Amicable settlements   0 1 0 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 3 1 4 3 32 
… Administrative rulings     1 4 5 3 1 2 3 1 0 3 1 2 2 4 0 2 0 2 36 
… Sanctions under art. 49a para. 1 
Cartel Act 
  0 0               1 2 1 5 3 2 5 3 2 6 30 
… Part-rulings   0                   0 0           0 1 1 
Procedural rulings                        0 0   7 3 4 4 7 7 32 
Other rulings (publication, costs, 
searches, etc.)  
                      0 0           10 1 11 
Precautionary measures     4 2 0 0 4 2 1 1 2 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 24 
Sanctions under art. 50 Cartel Act       2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1           1       6 
Preliminary Investigations                                           
Conducted during the year   63 40 39 36 40 38 46 47 75 56 28 19 19 22 40 33 27 20 18 706 
Carried forward from previous year   19 20 17 16 19 18 27 25 37 46 21 11 11 15 12 18 18 16 14 380 
Opened    44 20 22 20 21 20 19 22 38 16 7 8 8 7 28 15 9 4 4 332 
Concluded    43 23 24 20 21 23 30 20 28 35 18 12 7 13 27 17 11 11 7 390 
… Investigations opened   5 3 10 9 4 9 4 3 2 2 1 2 1 3 1 4 3 1 1 68 
… Modification of conduct           8 6 7 2 15 9 6 2 4 6 7 7 1 8 2 90 
… No consequences    38 20 14 11 9 8 19 13 11 24 11 8 2 4 18 6 7 2 4 229 
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Other activities                                         0 
Notifications under Art. 49a para. 3 
let. a Cartel Act 
                7 40 32 26 31 12 13 22 10 7 2 2 204 
Advice                 56 53 22 28 23 35 56 39 25 20 27 17 401 
Market monitoring               95 82 29 46 62 36 87 105 62 58 76 61 33 832 
Freedom of information applications                                     13 23 36 
Reports of failure to pass on foreign 
exchange benefits 
                            n.a.  371 96 18     485 
Other enquiries                 154 487 412 212 246 210 374 566 680 547 594 685 5167 
Mergers                                           
Notifications   22 26 33 54 35 42 30 21 27 29 45 40 26 34 30 28 32 30 29 613 
No objection after preliminary 
examination 
      31 52 33 38 25 16 24 26 39 39 19 29 29 28 26 35 26 515 
Investigations       0 1 2 4 5 6 6 3 5 3 5 1 1 0 0 1 3 46 
Decisions of the Competition 
Commission 
  21   0 1 2 0 2 2 1 0 3 2 4 1 1 1 0 0 0 41 
… After preliminary examination   19 22                     1 0 0 1 0 0 0 43 
… After investigation    2 6 0                 2 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 15 
Sanctions   2 3 3 2 1 1 0 2 0       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
Early implementation   1 1 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0     8 
Appeal proceedings                                           
Total number of appeals before the 
Federal Administrative Court and 
Federal Supreme Court 
                      0 12 6 14 11 13 14 25 24 119 
Judgments of the Federal 
Administrative Court 
                        8 1 8 1 1 4 7 3 33 
… Success for the competition 
authority 
                      2 7 1 6 1 1 3 3 2 26 
… Partial success                       0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Judgments of the Federal Supreme 
Court 
                          0 0 1 1 1 0 2 5 
… Success for the competition 
authority 
                          0 0 0 1 1 0 2 4 
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… Partial success                           0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pending at the end of year (before 
Federal Administrative Court and 
Federal Supreme Court) 
                        4 5 9 9 11 13 21   72 
Expert reports, recommendations 
and opinions etc. 
                                          
Accompanying Conversion   5 6                                   11 
Expert reports (Art. 15 Cartel Act)   0 1 4 1 0 2 0 3 2 1 1 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 23 
Recommendations (Art. 45 Cartel 
Act) 
  4 0 3 3 4 1 2 0 2 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 
Expert opinions (Art. 47 Cartel Act, 5 
para. 4 PMA or 11a TCA) 
    4 2 1 4 2 2 7 5 2 4 3 0 2 1 2 1 2 0 44 
Follow-up checks   8 12 5 0 4 3 2 1 1 3 1 1 4 0 3 1 1 6 0 56 
Determining dispositions     1 2 1                               4 
Notices (Art. 6 Cartel Act)     2 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 0   2 0 1 0 0 1 12 
Opinions (Art. 46 para. 1 Cartel Act)    30 75 38 86 59 22 12 13 7 49 84 71   177 219 250 217 254 281 1944 
Consultation proceedings (Art. 46 
para. 2 Cartel Act)  
                            5 8 8 5 5 8 39 
IMA                                           
Recommendations / Investigations 
(Art. 8 IMA) 
  5 4 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 0       0 0 1 1 3 2 23 
Expert reports (Art. 10 I IMA)      1 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0   2 1 1 2 1 1 13 
Explanatory reports (Secretariat)     4 2 2 11 7 6 3 4 8 25 31   19 26 45 36 36 45 310 
Appeals (Art. 9 para. 2bi s IMA)                     0 3 3   2 1 3 6 5 1 24 
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C)  Data Set of Competition Commissions Investigations 
 
  
Untersuchungen Seiten-Von Anzahl Seiten Jahr Veröffentlicht Startdatum Enddatum Dauer Firma O ECD Numbers Verstoss Verstoss Art Econ Rationals Verfahrenskosten Kosten getragen durch Auskommen Informiert worden durch Start Vorabklärungen
Contrats de distribution automobiles 178 1 1997 20. Jan 97 Automobilindustrie 3.5 Exklusivverträge 4 -
Telecom PTT/Blue Window 161 14 1997 24. Sep 96 05. Mai 97 223 Telecom PTT 9 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 CHF 5'150.00 Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Anzeige 04. Sep 96
Nutztierfütterung 175 3 1997 07. Aug 96 16. Jun 97 313 Coop, Migros 6 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 CHF 5'030.00 Firmen Eingestellt Anzeige 22. Jul 96
Recymet SA 332 2 1997 15. Aug 97 27. Aug 97 Recymet S A 10 Akteneinsicht Art. 23 KG 4 - Firmen Abgelehnt Gesuchsteller
Sammelrevers für Musiknoten 334 10 1997 11. Nov 96 01. Sep 97 294
Schweizer Verband der Musikalien-
Händler und -Verleger 10 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 2 CHF 4'150.00 Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Informant 05. Sep 96
Telecom PTT-Fachhändlerverträge 506 9 1997 25. Apr 97 15. Dez 97 234 Telecom PTT, Telecom Direktion Zürich, 9 Missbrauchs einer marktbeherrschenden StellungArt. 7 KG. 2 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Informant
Recymet SA 490 16 1997 04. Jun 97 15. Dez 97 194 Batrec AG 10 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1,2 - - Eingestellt Anzeige
Swisscom - Centrex 377 5 1998 22. Jan 98 22. Jun 98 151 Swisscom AG 9 Genehmigung einer einvernehmlichen RegelungArt. 29 KG - - Einvernehmliche Regelung Anzeige 08. Okt 97
Service- und Reparaturleistungen an Öl-/Gasbrennern und Kompaktwärmezentralen382 10 1998 24. Nov 97 17. Aug 98 266 VSO (Verband Schweizerischer Öl- und Gasbrennerunternehmen), KRW (Vereinigung der Kessel- und Radiatoren-Werke). PROCAL (Lieferantenverband Heizungsmaterialien), VUOG (Verband unabhängiger Öl- und Gasbrenner-Unternehmungen), CLIMA SUISSE (Verband Schweizerischer Heizungs- und Lüftungsfirmen), SSIV (Schweizerischer Spenglermeister- und Installateur- Verband)4 Unzulässige Wettb werbsabr de Art. 5 KG 1 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderung n Informant 03. Apr 97
Telecom PTT-Fachhändlerverträge 599 2 1998 12. Nov 98 21. Dez 98 Swisscom AG 9 Einstellungsverfügung Art. 7 KG - - Eingestellt Weko
Minolta 247 8 1999 07. Jun 97 01. Mär 99 632 Minolta (Schweiz) S.A. 6 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Eingestellt Informant 28. Apr 97
Spitallisten bei Halbprivatversicherungen mit eingeschränkter Spitalwahlfreiheit220 27 1999 02. Okt 96 19. Apr 99 929 Arcovita, Visana, CSS 8 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Eingestellt Informant
Bahnhofkioske 403 20 1999 14. Sep 98 05. Jul 99 294 SBB, Kiosk AG, Alimentana 7 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Eingestellt Informant 22. Apr 98
Markt für Versicherungsprodukte in der obligatorischen Krankenpflegeversicherung im Kanton Zürich484 6 1999 19. Jan 98 06. Sep 99 595 Ärztegesellschaft des Kantons Zürich 10 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Eingestellt Informant
Sammelrevers 1993 für den Verkauf preisgebundener Verlagserzeugnisse in der Schweiz454 30 1999 28. Sep 98 06. Sep 99 343 Schweizer Buchhändler- und Verlegerverband, Börsenverein des deutschen Buchhandels e.V.6 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Weko
Schweizerische Meteorologische Anstalt 423 21 1999 17. Nov 98 06. Sep 99 293 Schweizerische Meteorologische Anstalt 10 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen InformantRecommandations de prix pour les boissons 
servies 25 4 2000 18. Mai 99 07. Feb 00 265
Gastrofribourg, Gastrovalais, 
Gastrojura, la Société vaudoise des 6 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Einvernehmliche Regelung Informant 25. Nov 98
Prix des quotidiens tessinois (per l'italiano B 2.2 2.) 16 9 2000 12. Jul 99 07. Feb 00 210 Società Editrice Corriere del T icino SA, Opera Giornale del Popolo, Regiopress SA9 Unzulässige Wettb werbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Einvernehmliche Regelung Weko 30. Nov 98
BKW FMB Energie AG 29 7 2000 13. Jul 99 07. Feb 00 209 BKW FMB Energie AG 4 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Eingestellt Anzeige 17. Mär 99
Accords sur les prix/répartition des ventes sur le marché des vitamines186 10 2000 21. Jun 99 19. Apr 00 303 Hoffmann-La Roche AG 3.3 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Informant
Volkswagen-Vertriebssystem 196 16 2000 07. Okt 97 08. Mai 00 944 Volkswagen AG, Audi AG 3.5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 4 - - Eingestellt Anzeige 09. Okt 96
Des tarifs conseillés de l'Association fribourgeoise des écoles de circulation (AFEC)167 19 2000 27. Jul 99 08. Mai 00 286 AFEC 3.5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Weko 18. Dez 98
Vertrieb von Markenartikeln im Detailhandel 212 12 2000 03. Nov 97 05. Jun 00 945 Migros, Coop, Syntrade, EG Dritte Kraft 6 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 4 - - Eingestellt Anzeige
Vertrieb von Arzneimitteln/Sanphar 320 76 2000 20. Apr 98 07. Jun 00 779 Sanphar 6 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 4 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Weko
Markt für Strassenbeläge 588 48 2000 20. Jul 99 04. Dez 00 503 Badertscher AG, BHT, BHZ, Biturit , FBB, Siderit 5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Anzeige 21. Dez 98
Intensiv SA  Grancia 95 15 2001 23. Sep 99 18. Dez 00 452 Intensiv SA, Grancia 3.5 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Anzeige
Kaladent AG 88 7 2001 23. Sep 99 29. Jan 01 494 Kaladent AG 3.5 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Eingestellt Informant 11. Mär 97
Chambre genevoise de l'étanchéité et de l'asphaltage (CGE) 110 5 2001 10. Jan 00 05. Mär 01 420 La Chambre genevoise de l’étanchéité et de l’asphaltage5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Einvernehmliche Regelung Weko
Watt/Migros - EEF 255 38 2001 14. Jun 00 05. Mär 01 264 Elektra Baselland Liestal 4 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Anzeige 07. Mär 00
JC Decaux/Affichage 306 26 2001 07. Okt 99 07. Mai 01 578 JC Decaux,  Affichage 9 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Eingestellt Weko
Watt/Migros - EBL 293 13 2001 04. Aug 00 07. Mai 01 276 Elektra Baselland Liestal 4 Zuständigkeit Art. 7 KG - - Abgelehnt Gesuchsteller
Teleclub vs. Cablecom 503 7 2001 21. Jun 99 10. Aug 01 781 Cablecom Holding AG 9 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Eingestellt Anzeige
SUMRA/Distribution de montres 510 13 2001 23. Aug 99 03. Sep 01 742 AMS (Association des fournisseurs d'horlogerie - marché suisse), (Zentralverband Schweizerischer Goldschmiede und Uhrenfachgeschäfte) 3.5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Einvernehmliche Regelung Weko 30. Nov 98
Watt/Migros - SIE 688 7 2001 04. Sep 00 03. Sep 01 364 Inter-Service, Electricity S 4 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Eingestellt Anzeige
Tarifvertrag in der halbprivaten Zusatzversicherung 645 43 2001 12. Mai 00 01. Okt 01 507 Aargauischen Ärzteverband,  Klinik im Schachen, Klinik Sonnenblick, Klinik Villa im Park, der Klinik Schützen, der Helsana AG, der Concordia, der Unimedes, der CSS,  Aargauischer Krankenkassenverband10 U zuläss ge Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Einvernehmliche Regelung Selbstanzeige 08. Okt 99
Lokoop AG vs. SBB AG 72 5 2002 16. Feb 00 03. Okt 01 595 SBB AG 7 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Eingestellt Informant 19. Mai 99
Privatärztetarife im Kanton Zürich 695 6 2001 09. Mai 00 05. Nov 01 545 Ärztegesellschaft des Kantons Zürich 10 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Eingestellt Informant 19. Okt 98
Mobilfunkmarkt 97 33 2002 01. Mai 00 03. Dez 01 581 Swisscom, Diax,  Orange 9 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen Art. 5 KG, Art. 7 KG 1 - - Eingestellt Weko
Benzinmarkt Schweiz (Zeitraum 1993 - 2000) 77 20 2002 03. Mai 00 03. Dez 01 579 Agip (Suisse) SA,  AGROLA, BP (Switzerland), Elf Oil Switzerland SA, Esso (Schweiz) GmbH,  Migrol-Genossenschaft,  Coop Mineraloel AG, Shell (Switzerland),  Tamoil (Suisse) SA,  AVIA Vereinigung unabhängiger Schweizer Importeure von Erdölprodukten,4 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Eingest llt Anzeige 21. Mär 00
Submission Betonsanierung am Hauptgebäude der Schweizerischen Landesbibliothek (SLB)130 15 2002 13. Jan 00 17. Dez 01 704 Isotech AG, Renesco AG, Betosan AG, Weiss+Appetito AG5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Anzeige
Système de distribution Citroën 455 11 2002 02. Nov 98 19. Aug 02 1386 Citroën AG 3.5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 4 - - Einvernehmliche Regelung Selbstanzeige
Kreditkarten-Akzeptanzgeschäft 106 54 2003 10. Sep 99 18. Nov 02 1165 Cornèr Banca SA, Diners Club (Schweiz) AG, Swisscard AECS AG, UBS Card Center AG, Telekurs Europay AG8 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 1 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Weko 14. Okt 98
Tarification des honoraires de médecins genevois en matière de soins privés265 6 2003 24. Okt 01 16. Dez 02 418 Association des Médecins du Canton de Genève 10 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Eingestellt Weko
Fahrschule Graubünden 271 26 2003 13. Jul 99 06. Jan 03 1273 Autofahrlehrerverband des Kantons Graubünden 6 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Einvernehmliche Regelung Weko 18. Dez 98
Credit Suisse/Bank Linth 514 15 2003 06. Mai 02 19. Mai 03 378 Credit Suisse - Bank Linth 8 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Gegenstandslos Selbstanzeige
Veterinärmedizinische Tests/Migros 753 21 2003 17. Dez 02 20. Okt 03 307 Migros 6 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Gegenstandslos Anzeige 25. Sep 01
TicketCorner 778 25 2004 15. Apr 02 01. Dez 03 595 TicketCorner 6 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Anzeige 14. Aug 01
Swisscom ADSL 407 42 2004 06. Mai 02 15. Dez 03 588 Swisscom AG, Swisscom Fixnet AG 9 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Informant
Markt für Schlachtschweine - Teil A 674 52 2004 01. Feb 02 15. Mär 04 773
Migros (Micarna) und Coop (Bell 
Holding) 6 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Eingestellt Weko 11. Apr 01
Simon Kohler 
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Markt für Schlachtschweine - Teil B 726 52 2004 01. Feb 02 15. Mär 04 773 Migros-Genossenschafts-Bund Coop Schweiz 6 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Eingestellt Anzeige 11. Apr 01
Association des cliniques privées de Genève 803 3 2004 18. Aug 03 05. Apr 04 231 Vereinigung der Genfer Privatkliniken 10 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Eingestellt Weko 24. Jan 03
ErfahrungsMedizinisches Register (EMR): Eskamed AG 449 36 2004 26. Feb 02 26. Apr 04 790 Eskamed AG 10 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Gegenstandslos Anzeige 15. Mär 01
Tarifvertrag mit Privatkliniken in der halbprivaten Zusatzversicherung im Kanton AG1026 14 2004 12. Mai 00 01. Okt 04 1603
Unimedes, Helsana, Konkordia, CSS 
sowie andere der santésuisse Aargau- 10 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 4 - - Eingestellt Weko 08. Okt 99
Tarifvertrag mit öffentlichen Spitälern in der halbprivaten Zusatzversicherung im Kanton AG1018 8 2004 17. Dez 02 01. Okt 04 654 Gesundheitsdepartement des Kantons Aargau,  Vereinigung Aargauischer Krankenhäuser, CSS Versicherungen, Helsana Versicherungen AG, Konkordia, Unimedes, Visana Bern, diverse der santésuisse Aargau- Solothurn angeschlossene Krankenversicherer10 Unzulässige Wettbew rbsabr de Art. 5 KG 1 - - Eingestellt Weko
Vertrieb von T ierarzneimitteln 1040 60 2004 25. Mai 00 11. Okt 04 1600 Schweizerischer T ierarzneimittelhersteller und  Grossisten,  Gesellschaft Schweizerischer T ierärzte3.3 Unzuläs ige Wettbewerbsabr de Art. 5 KG 4 - - Einvernehmliche Regelung Weko 06. Aug 99
Krankenversicherer/Weita AG 1100 21 2004 27. Mär 03 25. Okt 04 578 santésuisse, Weita AG 8 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 4 - - Eingestellt Informant 02. Okt 02
CoopForte 146 25 2005 03. Dez 01 08. Nov 04 1071 Coop 6 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - Firmen Einvernehmliche Regelung Anzeige
ETA SA Manufacture Horlogère Suisse 128 18 2005 04. Nov 02 08. Nov 04 735 ETA SA Manufacture Horlogère Suisse 3.5 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - Firmen Einvernehmliche Regelung Informant 03. Okt 02
Swisscom "Talk & Surf" 248 3 2005 16. Feb 04 08. Nov 04 266 Swisscom AG 9 Gesuch um Erlassung einer Feststellungsverfügung - Später entschieden Abgelehnt Gesuchsteller
Swisscom Directories AG betreffend Herstellung,  Verwaltung und Herausgabe von regulierten Verzeichnisdaten gemäss Artikel 29 der Verordnung über Fernmeldedienste vom 31. Oktober 2001 (FDV; SR 784.101.1) 54 60 2005 04. Nov 03 22. Nov 04 384 Der Swisscom Directories AG 9 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Eingestellt Informant
Feldschlösschen Getränke Holding/Coca Cola AG/Coca Cola Beverages AG114 14 2005 20. Nov 00 06. Dez 04 1477 Feldschlösschen Getränke Holding, Coca Cola AG, Coca Cola Beverages AG3.1 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Anzeige
Sammelrevers 1993 für den Verkauf preisgebundener Verlagserzeugnisse in der Schweiz269 43 2005 28. Sep 98 21. Mär 05 2366 Schweizer Buchhändler- und Verlegerverband, Börsenverein des deutschen Buchhandels e.V.6 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 4 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Weko
Swico/Sens 251 18 2005 31. Mai 02 21. Mär 05 1025 Swico, Sens 3.4 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - Weko Eingestellt Weko
Kreditkarten - Interchange Fee 65 53 2006 06. Jan 04 05. Dez 05 699 UBS AG, Credit Suisse, Viseca Card Services SA, Cornèr Banca SA, Telekurs Multipay AG8 Unzulässig  Wettbewerbs brede Art. 5 KG 1 - - Einvernehmliche Regelung Informant 10. Apr 03
Vertriebspartnerschaften der AEW Energie AG und der Axpo Vertrieb AG (ehemals Axpo AG),  des Elektrizitätswerks des Kantons Thurgau und der Axpo Vertrieb AG (ehemals Axpo AG),  des Elektrizitätswerks des Kantons Zürich und der Axpo Vertrieb AG (ehemals Axpo AG),  der St. Gallisch-Appenzellischen Kraftwerke AG und der Axpo Vertrieb AG (ehemals Axpo AG)227 15 2006 27. Mär 02 19. Dez 05 1363 AEW Energie AG, Axpo Vertrieb AG, die Elektrizitätswerk des Kantons Thurgau AG, Elektrizitätswerke des Kantons Zürich St. Gallisch-Appenzellischen Kraftwerke AG4 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Eingestellt Informant 10. Aug 01
Flughafen Zürich AG (Unique) - Valet Parking 625 43 2006 01. Dez 03 18. Sep 06 1022 Flughafen Zürich AG 7 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Einvernehmliche Regelung Weko
Axpo/Migros - EBL; Verweigerung der Durchleitung von Strom64 7 2007 04. Aug 00 06. Nov 06 2285 Elektra Baselland Liestal 4 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Eingestellt Anzeige 14. Feb 00
Kreditkarten-Akzeptanzgeschäft 71 8 2007 10. Sep 99 18. Dez 06 2656 Cornèr Banca SA, UBS Card Center AG, Telekurs Multipay AG, Swisscard AECS AG8 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Gegenstandslos Weko
TicketCorner AG 79 3 2007 19. Jan 04 18. Dez 06 1064 TicketCorner AG 6 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - Weko Eingestellt Gesuchsteller
Terminierung Mobilfunk 241 63 2007 15. Okt 02 05. Feb 07 1574 Orange Communications AG, Swisscom Mobile AG und TDC Switzerland AG9 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Weko 2'500'000.00CHF            
Richtlinien des Verbandes Schweizersicher Werbegesellschaften VSW über die Kommissionierung von Berufsvermittlern190 51 2007 06. Nov 02 05. Mär 07 1580 Ad.X AG Ad Broker, Verband Schweizerischer Werbegesellschaften, Publigroupe SA9 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Einvernehmliche Regelung Anzeige 333'365'685.00CHF        Swisscom Mobile AG 333'365'685
Swisscom ADSL 410 5 2007 06. Mai 02 07. Mai 07 1827 Swisscom AG, Swisscom Fixnet AG 9 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - Weko Eingestellt Anzeige 28. Mär 02
Teleclub AG/Cablecom GmbH/Swisscable 400 10 2007 23. Sep 02 04. Jun 07 1715 Cablecom, Swisscable 9 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - Weko Eingestellt Informant
Neue Eisenbahn-Alpentransversale (NEAT) 415 16 2007 22. Nov 04 18. Jun 07 938 Holcim (Schweiz) AG, Ciments Vigier SA 5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - Weko Eingestellt Anzeige
Strassebeläge Tessin 85 28 2008 04. Apr 05 19. Nov 07 959 Aebischer SA, Atag SA, Batigroup (T icino SA), Botta & Co, Cogesa SA, Costra SA, Edilstrada SA, Franco Rossi SA, Industrie Chimiche Riunite SA, Mancini & Marti SA, Novastrada SA, Paviclass SA, Pavistra SA, Pavisud SA, Saisa SA, Spalu SA und Trevalbeton SA5 Unzulässige Verhal ensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Informa t
Submission Betonsanierung am Hauptgebäude der Schweizerischen Landesbibliothek339 10 2009 13. Jan 00 19. Nov 07 2867 Isotech AG, Renesco AG, Betosan AG, Weiss+Appetito AG5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - Weko Eingestellt Informant
Debitkarten-Akzeptanzgeschäft (Nichtdiskriminierungsklausel NDR)248 2 2008 29. Jan 02 03. Mär 08 2225 Die Schweizerische Post, Cornèr Banca SA, UBS Card Center AG, Telekurs Multiplay AG8 Unzulässig  Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - Weko Sanktion Weko 50'000.00CHF                 
Publikation von Arzneimittelinformationen 385 27 2008 21. Jun 05 07. Jul 08 1112 Documed AG 3.3 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Einvernehmliche Regelung Anzeige
Tarifverträge Zusatzversicherung Kanton Luzern 544 49 2008 07. Feb 06 06. Okt 08 972 Concordia, CSS Versicherungen AG, Helsana Versicherungen AG, KPT Versicherungen AG, Sanitas Krankenversicherung, Swica Krankenversicherungen, Visana Services AG  Wincare,  Unimedes, Cosama, Kantonsspital Luzern, Kantonales Spital Sursee-Wolhusen, Psychiatriezentrum Luzern Stadt,  Psychiatrie Luzern Landschaft, Luzerner Höhenklinik Montana [LHM]) und das Gesundheits- und Sozialdepartement des Kantons Luzern8 Unzulässige W ttbewerbsb schränku gen Art. 5 KG, Art. 7 KG 1 - Weko Sanktion Selbst nzeig 55'000.00CHF                
Felco SA CHF 50'000 
Landi Schweiz AG CHF 5'000 
Sécateurs et cisailles 143 16 2009 07. Jan 08 25. Mai 09 504 Felco SA,  Landi Schweiz AG 3.5 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - - Einvernehmliche Regelung Selbstanzeige 1'122'950.00CHF            
Alpiq InTec West AG CHF 
271648.
Elektroinstallationsbetriebe Bern 196 27 2009 29. Jan 08 06. Jul 09 524 Atel Gebäudetechnik West AG, BKW ISP AG, Elektro Burkhalter AG, ETAVIS Arnold AG, Energie Wasser Bern, Gasser + Bertschy Elektro AG, Gfeller Elektro AG, Scherler AG, Kantonal-Bernischer Verband der Elektroinstallationsfirmen (KBVE), Verband Stadtbernischer Elektroinstallationsfirmen,  Gewerbeverband KMU Stadt Bern (KMU Bern)4 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 486'400.00CHF           Firmen Einv nehmliche Regelung Informant
Preispolitik Swisscom ADSL 116 67 2010 20. Okt 05 19. Okt 09 1460 Swisscom AG 9 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 349'321.00CHF           Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Informant 4'830'580.00CHF            
Gaba International AG - CHF 
4820580
Hors-Liste Medikamente: Preise von Cialis,  Levitra und Viagra649 54 2010 26. Jun 06 02. Nov 09 1225 Pfizer AG, Eli Lilly (Suisse) SA, Bayer (Schweiz) AG 3.3 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 4 692'118.00CHF           Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Weko 10. Mai 05 219'861'720.00CHF        Swisscom 219'861'720
Gaba 65 51 2010 08. Feb 07 30. Nov 09 1026 Gaba International AG 3.3 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 4 - - Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Anzeige 10. Mai 06
Vorsorgliche Massnahmen in Sachen Kreditkarten-Interchange Fees II473 26 2010 15. Jul 09 25. Jan 10 194 Credit Suisse (CS), Cornèr Banca SA (Cornèr Banca), UBS AG (UBS), Viseca Card Services AG (Viseca), Jelmoli Bo-nus Card AG (Jelmoli), Die Schweizerische Post (Post), GE Money Bank AG (GE Money). Acquirer: Aduno SA (Aduno), SIX Multipay AG (SIX Multipay), ConCardis Schweiz AG (ConCardis), B&S Card Service GmbH (B&S)8 Unzulässige W ttbewerbsabred  Art. 5 KG 1 - Später entschieden Einvernehmliche Regelung Weko
Hors-Liste Medikamente: Verfügung betreffend Geschäftsgeheimnisse/Publikation703 14 2010 04. Feb 10 Bayer (Schweiz) AG 3.3 Geschäftsgeheimnisse/Publikation der VerfügungArt. 24 KG 4'800.00CHF               Firmen Gewährt Gesuchsteller …
Komponenten für Heiz-, Kühl und Sanitäranlagen 615 42 2012 16. Dez 08 10. Mai 10 510 Flamco AG, Pneumatex AG, Walter Meier (Klima Schweiz) AG3.5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 127'000.00CHF           Firmen Einvernehmliche Regelung Selbstanzeige
Ausländische Biere 444 29 2010 30. Okt 08 28. Jun 10 606 Anheuser-Busch InBev NV/SA Grupo Modelo SAB 3.1 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 4 - Weko Sanktion Anzeige 7'626'863.00CHF            
Roto Frank AG CHF 0
SFS unimarket AG CHF 
Baubeschläge für Fenster und Fenstertüren 717 58 2010 16. Jul 07 18. Okt 10 1190
Roto Frank AG, SFS unimarket AG, 
Siegenia-Aubi AG, Aug. Winkhaus 3.4 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 718'670.00CHF           Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Selbstanzeige 7'029'000.00CHF            
Six/Terminals mit Dynamic Currency Conversion (DCC) 96 102 2011 17. Jan 07 29. Nov 10 1412 SIX Group AG, SIX Multipay AG, SIX Card Solutions AG wegen8 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 215'650.00CHF           Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Anzeige 24. Jul 06
Swatch Group Lieferstopp 400 9 2011 n.a. 06. Jun 11 Swatch Group AG 3.5 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 Später entschieden Einvernehmliche Regelung Selbstanzeige
Behinderung des Online-Handels 372 28 2011 15. Sep 10 11. Jul 11 299 Electrolux AG, V-Zug AG 3.5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - Firmen Einvernehmliche Regelung Informant 14. Sep 09Zwischenverfügung vom 10. August 2011 in 
Sachen Wettbewerbsabreden im Strassenund 264 6 2012 10. Aug 11 ERNE Holding AG Laufenburg, in Laufenburg, ERNE AG Bauunternehmung, in Laufenburg und Gebrüder Meier AG Rohrlei-tungsbau in Birrhard5 Akte einsicht 4'200.00CHF               Firmen Abgelehnt Gesuchsteller
ASCOPA 529 121 2011 01. Dez 08 31. Okt 11 1064
Association des fabricants, 
importateurs et fournis-seurs de 3.3 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 584'414.00CHF           Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Informant
Vertrieb von T ickets im Hallenstadion Zürich 74 39 2012 02. Feb 10 14. Nov 11 650 Aktiengesellschaft Hallenstadion Zürich, T icketcorner AG6 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen Art. 5 KG, Art. 7 KG 1 - WEKO Eingestellt Anzeige 24. Feb 09
Terminierung Mobilfunk 522 7 2011 15. Okt 02 12. Dez 11 3345 Swisscom AG, Sunrise Communications AG, Orange Communications9 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 - Weko Eingestellt WekoVerfügung vom 16. Dezember 2011 in Sachen 
Wettbewerbsabreden im Strassen- und T iefbau im 270 156 2012 08. Jun 09 16. Dez 11 921
Aktiengesellschaft Cellere, St. Gallen 
sowie 5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 525'490.00CHF           Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Anzeige 3'897'775.00CHF            
Die Aktiengesellschaft 
Cellere und die Cellere AG 
BMW 540 74 2012 25. Okt 10 07. Mai 12 560 BMW 3.5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 4 205'881.60CHF           Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Anzeige 156'868'150.00CHF        
Swatch Lieferstopp – Verlängerung der Vorsorglichen Massnahmen vom  6. Juni 2011260 4 2012 07. Mai 12 Swatch Group AG 3.5 Verlängerung der Vorsorglichen Massnahmen (Unzulässige Verhaltensweise)Art. 7 KG - - Genehmigt Weko 160'000.00CHF               Die Flamco AG wird für das unter Ziffer 1 be-schriebene Verhalten mit einem Betrag von CHF [160‘000-170‘000.-] belastet
Recommandations tarifaires de l’Union suisse des professionnels de l’immobilier – Section Neuchâtel657 12 2012 08. Jun 10 02. Jul 12 755 Union suisse des professi-onnels de l’immobilier – Section Neuchâtel6 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen Art. 5 KG, Art. 7 KG 1 Firmen Einvernehmliche Regelung Weko 07. Jan 09 35'000.00CHF                 
Vertrieb von Musik 820 22 2012 06. Jun 11 16. Jul 12 406 IFPI Schweiz,  Phononet AG, Media Control AG 6 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 91'753.00CHF             Firmen Einvernehmliche Regelung Anzeige 3'520'000.00CHF            
IFPI Schweiz – 
stellvertretend für seine 
Verfügung vom 10. Dezember 2012 in Sachen Abrede im Speditionsbereich142 68 2013 09. Okt 07 10. Dez 12 1889 Agility Logistics International BV, Deutsche Bahn AG, Deutsche Post AG, Kühne + Nagel International AG, Panalpina Welttransport (Holding) AG, Spedlogswiss7 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabred  Art. 5 KG 1 561'141.00CHF           Firmen Einvernehmliche Regelung Selbstanzeige 6'220'153.00CHF            
Agility Logistics 
International BV CHF 
Verfügung vom 18. März 2013 in Sachen Tele 2 vs. Swisscom210 12 2013 26. Mär 12 18. Mär 13 Swisscom 9 Wiedererwägungsgesuch Art. 30 KG 21'320.00CHF             Firmen Abgelehnt Gesuchsteller
Wettbewerbsabreden im Strassen- und T iefbau im Kanton Zürich524 129 2013 08. Jun 09 22. Apr 13 1414
Aktiengesellschaft Cellere in St. 
Gallen 5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 437'850.00CHF           Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Informant
Décision incidente du 1er juillet 2013 dans l‘enquête LIBOR/TIBOR/EURIBOR653 3 2013 02. Feb 12 01. Jul 13 515 [société fille] (Suisse) SA 8 Vorsorgliche Massnahmen Art. 27 KG 1 6'870.00CHF               Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen WEKO 493'208.00CHF               
Aktiengesellschaft Cellere 
und Cellere AG Zürich, 
Auskunftsverfügung in der Untersuchung LIBOR/TIBOR/EURIBOR in Sachen Herausgabe von Mitarbeiterkommunikation321 4 2013 01. Jul 13 ICAP plc 8 Auskunftspflicht Art. 27 3'490.00CHF               Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen WEKO
Sport im Pay-TV – Vorsorgliche Massnahmen 387 4 2014 03. Apr 13 08. Jul 13 96 CT Cinetrade AG, Teleclub AG 9 Vorsorgliche Massnahmen Art. 27 KG 1 Gesuchsteller Eingestellt Gesuchsteller
Swatch Group Lieferstopp 215 72 2014 06. Jun 11 21. Okt 13 868 Swatch Group AG 3.5 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 485'812.00CHF           Firmen Einvernehmliche Regelung Informant
Kosmetikprodukte (Dermalogica) 184 31 2014 26. Okt 11 21. Okt 13 726 Care on Skin GmbH, Dermalogica Inc. 3.3 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 4 -CHF                        WEKO Eingestellt Informant
Sport im Pay-TV – teilweise Verfahrenseinstellung 391 16 2014 03. Apr 13 18. Nov 13 Swisscom (Schweiz), CT Cinetrade AG, Teleclub AG 9 Verfahrenseinstellung Art. 27 KG -CHF                        WEKO Eingestellt WEKO
Jura 407 11 2014 27. Okt 11 30. Jun 14 977 Jura Elektroapparate AG 3.5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 - 1/2 Firmen Einvernehmliche Regelung Informant
ETA Preiserhöhungen 396 11 2014 14. Sep 09 14. Jul 14 1764 ETA SA Manufacture Horlogère Suisse 3.5 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 1.00CHF                      WEKO Sanktion Gesuchsteller 24. Nov 08
Preispolitik und andere Verhaltensweisen der SDA 670 36 2014 22. Feb 12 14. Jul 14 873 Schweizerischen Depeschenagentur AG (SDA) 9 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 182'400.00CHF           Firmen Einvernehmliche Regelung WEKO 1'880'000.00CHF            
Türprodukte 246 79 2015 08. Dez 08 17. Nov 14 2170 Fritz Blaser & Cie. AG, Rudolf Geiser AG ,  Glutz AG , Immer AG in Uetendorf, Paul Koch AG,  Eugen Koch AG in St. Gallen, KWB Beschläge AG, OPO Oeschger AG , SFS unimarket AG3.5 Unzulässige W ttbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 4 324'308.10CHF           Firmen Einvernehmliche Regelung Gesuchsteller 0
Kreditkarten Domestische Interchange Fees II (KKDMIF II) 165 28 2015 15. Jul 09 01. Dez 14 1965 BonusCard.ch AG, Cembra Money Bank AG, Cornèr Banca, Credit Suisse AG, PostFinance AG, UBS AG, Viseca Card Services AG, Aduno SA, 9. B+S Card Service GmbH, ConCardis GmbH und SIX Payment Services AG8 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 Fi men Ein ernehmliche Regelung Selbstanzeige 0
Tunnelreinigung 193 53 2015 05. Feb 13 23. Feb 15 748 besa strassenunterhalt AG, ISS Schweiz AG, MRR Holding AG5 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 298'425.90CHF           Firmen Einvernehmliche Regelung Informant 185'500.00CHF               
Fritz Blaser & Cie. AG mit 
einem Betrag von CHF 
Saiteninstrumente (Gitarren und Bässe) und Zubehör 722 35 2016 03. Jul 13 29. Jun 15 726 Musik Olar AG 6 Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede Art. 5 KG 4 Einvernehmliche Regelung Anzeige 0
Swisscom WAN-Anbindung 128 90 2016 18. Jul 13 21. Sep 15 795 Swisscom AG 9 Unzulässige Verhaltensweise Art. 7 KG 2 200'836.00CHF           Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen Gesuchsteller 7'916'438.00CHF            
Online-Buchungsplattformen für Hotels 67 61 2016 11. Dez 12 19. Okt 15 1042
Booking.com, HRS-Hotel 
Reservation Service, Robert, Ragge 6
Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede, unzulässige 
Verhaltensweise Art. 5 KG, Art. 7 KG 4 374'243.00CHF           2/3 Firmen Verpflichtung zu Änderungen 06. Jun 12
Flügel und Klaviere 652 70 2016 26. Nov 12 14. Dez 15 1113 Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. GmbH & Co. KG, La Bottega del Pianoforte SA, Loeb Holding AG, AKHZ Management AG, Musik Hug AG, Steinway&Sons6 Unzulässige Wet b werbsabrede Art. 5 KG 1 471'249.00CHF           Firmen Einvernehmliche Regelung Informant 65'000.00CHF                 Musik Olar
